计算机的发展综述论文:China's Housing: Subsidized, Not Subprime中国楼市会上演美国楼市崩盘一幕吗

China's property sector is a larger but less worrisome animal than its U.S. cousin.In 2010, investment in residential real estate accounted directly for 12% of China's gross domestic product, up from 10% in 2009 and a record. Throw in demand for construction material, and real estate's contribution is even larger. By contrast, the peak of spending on U.S. residential investment in 2005 was equal to just 6% of GDP.A larger role for real estate in the Chinese economy means the consequences of a bust should be more serious than in the U.S. And recent years offer a worrying precedent. A crackdown on speculation saw growth in real-estate investment fall from 31% a year at the end of 2007 to 3% at the beginning of 2009. The hit to construction spending, as much as the fall in exports, crunched China's GDP growth to a decade low of 6.5%.At first sight, history appears ready to repeat itself as prices run up sharply. The official house-price data tend to underestimate changes. But data from Soufun Holdings, which runs China's leading property website, show average prices in first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai rising considerably faster than disposable incomes.Meanwhile, breakneck construction in 2009 and 2010 has created an overhang of supply--including the ghost blocks of high-end residential apartments bought for speculative purposes that loom large in the bears' arguments. The government continues to clamp down on speculators. That double whammy will at some point bring the price surge to an end and take the wind out of real-estate developers' sails.But when private investment fell away in 2008, there was nothing to take its place. This time round, the government plans a huge investment in affordable housing. The thin margins available in affordable construction are cold comfort for listed developers, but plans to build 10 million new budget residences in 2011 should to an extent cushion China's economy from a sharp slowdown in private-sector construction.In the U.S., post-crash housing is still weighed down by overbuilding in certain hot spots. In China, urbanization and rising wages mean most construction is better underpinned by demand. And houses are generally paid for with cash, not credit. In the U.S., mortgage debt reached 103% of GDP in 2007. In China, long-term loans to households, a proxy for mortgage borrowing, is 16% of GDP. Even throwing in loans to real-estate developers and a share of loans to local government investment vehicles--some of which are invested in property--takes the total only to 50%.A slowdown in prices, if not an outright decline in some cities, is a distinct possibility. That will hurt private developers. A sharp enough correction will cause the banks pain and hit consumer confidence and spending. But it shouldn't signal economic disaster as it did in the U.S.Tom Orlik与美国相比，中国房地产业规模更大，却不那么令人担心。2010年，中国住宅房地产投资占中国国内生产总值(GDP)的12%，高于2009年的10%，为历年之最。若再算上对建材的需求，中国房地产业对GDP的贡献率甚至会更高。相形之下，美国住宅投资开支2005年达到峰值，但也只相当于美国GDP的6%而已。房地产业在中国经济中扮演着更为重要的角色，这也意味着该产业一旦崩溃，其后果应该比美国楼市产生的影响更严重。近年来，中国房地产业的发展已给我们提供了一个令人堪忧的先例。中国政府打击房地产投机行为的同时，房地产投资增长从2007年底的31%大幅降至2009年初的3%。建筑开支大幅萎缩对中国GDP增长的影响与出口额下降对GDP的影响一样深，中国GDP因此一度降至十年来的最低值6.5%。乍一看，中国房价大幅攀升，楼市崩盘的历史似乎即将重演。中国公布的官方房价数据往往会低估房价变化。但中国主要房地产网站搜房网(Soufun Holdings)的数据显示，北京和上海等一线城市平均房价的上涨速度大大快于人们可支配收入的增长。此外，2009年和2010年飞速的住房建设导致供应过剩。一些人出于投机目的购买的高档公寓，却因无人居住而变得象鬼楼，这些公寓在有关房地产市场是否将走下坡路的争论中被一再提起。中国政府继续严厉打击投机者。在这种双重打击之下，房价激增的现象将在某个特定时刻消失，地产开发商将受到冲击。但是当2008年私人投资逐渐减少时，却没有新的投资可以取而代之。这次，中国政府计划大举投资保障房建设。建设保障房利润微薄，对于上市开发商来说可谓是于事无补，但2011年新建1,000万套保障房的计划应该可以在一定程度上抵消私人投资房地产建设急剧放缓对中国经济造成的影响。在美国某些热点城市，崩盘后的房地产市场依然因过度建设而不景气。在中国，城市化和工资上涨意味着大多数房屋建设都因有需求而得到了较好的支撑。而且，中国很多人都是用现金购房，而不是贷款买房。2007年，美国房屋抵押贷款债务是其GDP的103%，而中国家庭长期贷款额(衡量按揭贷款的指标)占GDP的比重为16%，即使算上地产商的贷款和地方政府投资工具的贷款份额，也不过仅占到中国GDP的50%。地方政府的部分贷款投资于房地产市场。中国房价增速放缓（如果不是大幅下降的话）还是很有可能的。这将冲击私营地产商。楼市大幅调整将导致银行陷入麻烦，打击消费者信心，减少消费开支，但应该不会预示中国将出现一如美国的经济灾难。