逆战官网qq卡卡号:一步之差：中国体制的天堂与地狱

徘徊在生死边缘的中国体制

Editor's Note:

编者语：

The US "return to Asia" and its continuing military pullout from the Middle East has caused worries that a new era of conflict between the US and China is coming. Can the US tolerate the emergence of another possible superpower? Is the "China model" replacing the US one? Global Times reporter Wang Wen (Wang) talked to John Hamre (Hamre), former US deputy secretary of defense and president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, on these issues.

美国“重回亚洲”以及其从中东地区的陆续撤兵又引起了不少担忧，也许新一轮的中美争斗即将上演。美国能够容忍另一个具备超级大国潜力国家的崛起吗？是否“中国模式”已经取代了“美国模式”？以下是环球时报记者王文(王)对话美国前国防部副部长、美国战略与国际研究中心总裁约翰·哈姆雷（哈姆雷）。美国战略与国际研究中心是总部设于华盛顿智囊集团，主要致力于国际问题的研究。

Wang: Some Chinese are concerned that after Bin Laden's death, the US will shift its strategic focus to China. Is this a legitimate worry?

王：一些中国人担心在拉登死后，美国将会把战略矛头对准中国？这种担忧合理吗？

Hamre: I think most Americans think that a prosperous China which brings hundreds of millions of people out of poverty is a good thing. But I do think we are probably going to have more tense relations with China over the next 10 years, not because we are trying to fight the rise of China, but because China has become so much more dynamic and complex than ever before.

哈姆雷：我认为，多数美国人会觉得中国的繁荣富强能使上亿人摆脱贫穷是一件好事。但的确，在未来的10年中，中美关系将会更加紧张。这并不是因为我们要遏制中国的崛起，而是因为中国会变得比以前任何时候都要动荡和复杂。

Relations could become more tense, but it's not something anybody wants. I do think there is a feeling in China that China had a freer political opportunity because the US was occupied in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

并不是谁故意想让中美关系更加紧张。但我坚信由于美国陷入了阿富汗和伊拉克泥沼之中，中国有人会以为他们将迎来更大的政治机遇。1

But I think those scholars make a mistake because they think the US is fighting China's modernization. We are not. I think many Americans are impressed by China's modernization and want to be a part of it.

一些学者认为美国在阻碍中国的现代化，但他们错了。我们没有阻碍什么。我认为许多美国人都目睹了中国的现代化程度，他们也想投身于此。

Wang: Can there be only one top economy?

王：全世界只能有一个超级经济体？

Hamre: I have a somewhat different view. There had been three truly international political systems in human history. The first one started around 1648. It was the rise of the European empires, which competed for power and control over the rest of the world. This first international system was based in Europe, and both the US and China were on its edge. It was about economic mercantilist power, and the mode of operation of that international system was the balance of power-shifting alliances and patterns of loyalty. The rest of the world was caught in it. That international system lasted from 1648 to 1945. 

哈姆雷：我不这么认为。在人类历史上，曾存在过三种真正意义上的国际政治格局。第一种大约始于1648年。当时欧洲帝国崛起，他们相互较量，争夺世界的控制权。所以第一种国际格局形成于欧洲，而那时候美国和中国都只能靠边站。基于重商主义经济，这种国际格局的运作模式是联盟间实力的转换与制衡，以及高度的团结。除欧洲以外，世界剩余的部分都被卷入其中。那种国际格局从1648年持续至1945年。

World War II ended it because it broke the back of the European empire system. This caused power to shift away from Europe. What emerged after World War II was a new international system – sometimes called the "Cold War" era. This was a standoff between the West, the US, versus the international communist world, centered around the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union tried to keep China as a part of their camp. China broke free in the early 1960s, but this international system was very much structured between these two camps. That system ended in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed.

由于二战破坏了欧洲帝国秩序的基础，所以二战后此国际格局瓦解。这使得权力从欧洲转移。二战后形成了一种新的国际格局——有时也称作“冷战”时代。那是西方列强与美国一同与以苏联为中心的国际共产主义世界对峙的格局。苏联试图将中国拉入其大本营。但中国在20世纪60年代早期退出，但此时国际格局已经在两大阵营中形成。1989年苏联解体后，这种格局也随之瓦解。

We are now in a new third international system, which emerged after 1990. This third system has one single global superpower, the US, but a series of regional superpowers. 

现在我们正处于始于1990年的第三种国际格局。这个格局中只有一个全球性超级大国——美国，以及一系列的分散于各地区的大国。

In South America it's Brazil. In South Asia it's India. In West Asia it's Iran. In Europe it's the European Union. In Africa, maybe it is South Africa or Nigeria. In East Asia there are two regional superpowers – Japan and China. This system is going to be with us for maybe for another 20 years. 

南美的大国是巴西。南亚是印度。西亚是伊朗。欧洲是欧盟。非洲是南非或尼日利亚。在东亚则有“两虎”——中国和日本。此格局说不定还将持续20年。

Wang: What do you think about the "China model?"

王：你怎么看待“中国模式”？

Hamre: There are many Americans who look at what China can do and we are envious. China is moving so quickly. But China does that because it doesn't worry about the individual rights of citizens. 

哈姆雷：很多美国人都眼睁睁看着中国生龙活虎，我们表示很羡慕。中国发展得非常快。但中国之所以能够如此，是因为中国不受公民的个人权利的牵制。

I also think it's almost inevitable China is going to have to reconsider its current approach, because you are going to start experiencing substantial disappointment. 

但我还是觉得中国早晚要重新考虑其现在的发展模式，因为他们即将经历物质所带来的挫败。

For example, China spent almost $300 billion on high speed rail, but is now having problems with it. When a government with very few checks and balances decides to do something, it can make some brilliant decisions and do it well. But it also can make enormous mistakes.

举个例子，中国大概斥资3万亿搞高铁，但现在搞出了问题。当一个政府没有经过深思熟虑，各种力量尚缺乏制衡就动手干一件事，它往往能够想出一些天才的点子并且干的有声有色。但它往往也会弄出大麻烦。

You have an environment where growth is so important that there hasn't been enough attention to safety of food and products. I think your population is going to naturally push for more checks and balances in the system. That's going to come. And that's going to moderate the nature of your political economy. 

你中国现在只注重经济的发展而忽视食品和产品的安全。所以我觉得中国人当然会强烈要求实现体制中的制约和平衡，这会得到解决，而且将使中国政治经济的性质减弱。

I actually think China is on the edge of making a big mistake, which is to believe government bureaucrats can decide innovation. When China really started to modernize, it's when the government bureaucrats let go. It permitted individual entrepreneurs to do their own thing. That's when China grew so dramatically. 

实际上，我认为中国已经出于出大事的边缘了，因为人们相信政府官僚能进行一系列改革。而当年中国真正开始现代化进程的时刻正是政府官僚开始撒手不管的时刻。这时私人企业便可以大有作为，不必束手束脚。然后才中国开始迅猛向前发展。

I don't see a fundamental underlying philosophical alternative that China is proposing. You are proposing a more efficient political decision-making. I wish we had more efficient domestic political decision-making, but I also think your efficient decision-making process lets you make big mistakes more easily. But I am optimistic. I think China will find a good balance. 

我没看到中国在制定一个能从根本上确保万无一失的应对办法，相反，你们却在绞尽脑汁进行更加有效的政治控制。好吧，我也希望我们国家能在政治上进行更有效的决策，但你们的高效决策过程却使你们更容易犯下大错。但我是一个乐观主义者，我相信中国会找到一个好的平衡点。

Will it be an US style democracy? 

那将会是美式民主吗？

No. But I do think China will become more pluralistic, with greater transparency and a rule of law. I don't think this path is hostile or contradictory to where we are, or where we want to be. I just don't believe that. We could make some mistakes. We could read into your actual motives that cause us to make bad decisions and so could you. So we could mismanage this. But I think the underlying dynamic inside China is not hostile to our interest, and a rising and peaceful China is not at all contradictory to the US being a global superpower. 

不。但中国肯定会更加多元化，有更高的透明度和更完善的法制。我不认为这条路和我们现在的处境或我们的目的地相互矛盾。我就是不相信会那样。我们可能犯一些错误。我们可能误读了你们的真正动机，然后做出错误决策，你们同样也会。所以我们可能对此处置不当。但我认为中国内部潜在的动力并不会有损于我们的利益，而一个正在崛起的热爱和平的中国完全不会妨碍美国的超级大国地位。

Wang: What are your predictions on the international order in 2020? 

王：你对2020年的国际秩序有何预测？

Hamre: Not much is going to change between now and then. 

哈姆雷：跟现在没多大区别。

China's GDP will be much larger. The US will be out of the recession. It will take us another four to five years. Our fundamental power will not be much different. I look at the fundamentals of a nation's power as the size of the population, vitality of its economy and health of its intellectual vibrancy. We spend more than any other country on research and development, our population has strong coherence of our national identity, our citizens widely believe our system is fair and provides opportunity. Our civil society is remarkably strong and vibrant, it is breathtaking. 

中国的GDP肯定会更高。美国会走出衰退期。这还要花4到5年的时间。我们的根本国力不会发生太大的改变。我认为一个国家国力的根本是由人口规模、经济活力和智力活跃的健康程度决定的。我们花在研究和发展上的精力比任何国家都多，我们的人民有很强的凝聚力，他们坚信政府是公正的，机会可遇可求。我们的公民社会极为强大，其活跃程度令人惊叹。

So the fundamentals of the US are still going to be very strong. I don't think US is in decline. I do think China is rising. 

所以实质上美国将仍然十分强大。我不觉得美国在衰退。但我认为中国在不断前进。

In some people's mind that the rise of China is a threat, but it's not in mine, because there are enough logical changes that will take place inside China that will make China's rise compatible with the international system.

有些人认为中国的崛起是一个威胁，但我不赞同。因为在中国国内将会发生很多合理的改变，它们使中国的崛起与国际秩序兼容并济。

There are some concerns I have about China, I think China still over- promotes a popular image that China has been a victim throughout history, and that it's being victimized now. Certainly China was victimized 100 years ago and maybe 50 years ago. But for the last 35 years, the US has been trying to help China grow. We have encouraged our companies to invest in China, and encouraged Americans to go there. 

但对中国我也有一些忧虑。中国始终不断地对外过度宣传自己在历史进程中的受害者形象，现在好了，中国真的成受害者了。毫无疑问，中国在100年前或50年前是受害者。但在最近的35年中，美国一直试图助中国一臂之力。我们鼓励我们的企业到中国投资，也鼓励美国人去中国。

No doubt there was a time when China was victimized, when the Western powers chopped up China, humiliated the government, exploited the people and behaved almost criminally in forcing their way into the opium market. That's a scandalous ugly history. 

中国曾有一段时间受到残害，这不可否认，那时西方列强瓜分中国，羞辱中国政府，抢掠中国人民，用暴力将中国卷入鸦片市场，这几乎是犯罪。这段历史丑陋不堪。

There's no question that China was a victim. But that was in the past. Yet too many people in China continue to use that kind of rhetoric as a defining narrative for today, and I think that needs to change. But on balance, I'm very optimistic about our future, China's future and our relations with each other.

所以毫无疑问中国曾饱受迫害。但那是在过去。而现在太多的中国人还在用这一番叙述来定义今日的中国。我认为他们该换换脑筋了。不过总的来说，不管是对美国的未来、中国的未来，还是中美关系，我还是相当乐观的。