蕾拉的geass:美国世界第一的霸主地位结束了吗？
我们已经失去了美国的霸主地位吗？
I am an American, not by accident of birth but by choice. I voted with my feet and became an American because I love this country and think it is exceptional. But when I look at the world today and the strong winds of technological change and global competition, it makes me nervous. Perhaps most unsettling is the fact that while these forces gather strength, Americans seem unable to grasp the magnitude of the challenges that face us. Despite the hyped talk of China's rise, most Americans operate on the assumption that the U.S. is still No. 1.
我是一个美国人，不是偶然而是被选择出生在这里。我用我的脚作出选择然后变成了美国人是因为我热爱这个国家，认为它是一个优秀的国家。但是当我在今天世界中环顾四周时，科技转变的强烈之风和全球竞争使我紧张。也许最使我不安的是这些国家正在积聚力量，但是美国人好像还意识到我们面临的巨大的挑战。尽管中国地位上升的大肆炒作，大多数美国人仍然停留在美国是世界第一的假设上。
But is it? Yes, the U.S. remains the world's largest economy, and we have the largest military by far, the most dynamic technology companies and a highly entrepreneurial climate. But these are snapshots of where we are right now. The decisions that created today's growth — decisions about education, infrastructure and the like — were made decades ago. What we see today is an American economy that has boomed because of policies and developments of the 1950s and '60s: the interstate-highway system, massive funding for science and technology, a public-education system that was the envy of the world and generous immigration policies. Look at some underlying measures today, and you will wonder about the future.
美国还是第一吗？是的现在还是世界最大经济体，迄今为止我们还拥有世界上最强的军事力量，最有活力的科技公司和非常好的创业环境。但是这些只是我们现在的写照。创造今天成就的政策——关于教育，基础设施等等的政策——都是几十年前制定的。我们今天看到的美国的经济成就都是因为20世纪50和60年代对科技和公众教育系统的投入和宽松的移民政策，这些都令其他国家羡慕。看看今天的基本政策，你会担心我们的未来。
The following rankings come from various lists, but they all tell the same story. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), our 15-year-olds rank 17th in the world in science and 25th in math. We rank 12th among developed countries in college graduation (down from No. 1 for decades). We come in 79th in elementary-school enrollment. Our infrastructure is ranked 23rd in the world, well behind that of every other major advanced economy. American health numbers are stunning for a rich country: based on studies by the OECD and the World Health Organization, we're 27th in life expectancy, 18th in diabetes and first in obesity. Only a few decades ago, the U.S. stood tall in such rankings. No more. There are some areas in which we are still clearly No. 1, but they're not ones we usually brag about. We have the most guns. We have the most crime among rich countries. And, of course, we have by far the largest amount of debt in the world.
下面的排名来自格式表格，但是都反映了一个相同的事实。根据经济合作发展组织（OECD），我们15岁的孩子在科学方面排名第17，在数学排名第25.在发达国家中关于大学教育我们排名第12（从几十年的第一名跌落）。我们在小学生注册排名第79.我们的基础设施在世界上排名第23，远落后于其它发达经济体。美国人健康指标对于一个富裕国家来说是令人震惊的：根据OECD和世界卫生组织的研究，我们在平均寿命方面排名第27，在糖尿病方面排名第18，在肥胖排名第一。没几年前我们在所有的这些排名上都是第一。现在都不再是了。我们有最强大的军事。我们在发达国家中有最多的犯罪。当然到现在为止我们还有世界上最多的债务。
The Rise of the Rest
其它国家实力的增加
Many of these changes have taken place not because of America's missteps but because other countries are now playing the same game we are — and playing to win. There is a familiar refrain offered when these concerns are raised: "We heard all this in the 1980s. Japan was going to dominate the globe. It didn't happen, and America ended up back on top." It's a fair point as far as it goes. Japan did not manage to become the world's richest country — though for three decades it had the second largest economy and even now has the third largest. It is also a relatively small country. To become the largest economy in the world, it would have to have a per capita GDP twice that of the U.S. China would need to have an average income only one-fourth that of the U.S. to develop an economy that would surpass ours.
发生这么多变化不仅因为美国的失误，还因为其它国家正在参与我们参与的游戏——并且取得了胜利。当疑问出现时就会有熟悉的话音：“我们在20世纪80年代已经听过这些话了。日本将要主宰全球。但是没有发生，美国最终又回到了第一。”就目前情况来看这是个不错的观点。日本没有成为世界上最富有的国家——尽管它在30年里拥有第二大经济体即使现在也是第三大经济体，它也是一个相对小国，为了成为世界第一大经济体，它的人均GDP必须达到美国的两倍。中国要想超越我们只需要人均收入达到美国的四分之一就行了。
But this misses the broader point. The Harvard historian Niall Ferguson, who has just written a book, Civilization: The West and the Rest, puts things in historical context: "For 500 years the West patented six killer applications that set it apart. The first to download them was Japan. Over the last century, one Asian country after another has downloaded these killer apps — competition, modern science, the rule of law and private property rights, modern medicine, the consumer society and the work ethic. Those six things are the secret sauce of Western civilization."
但是这都没有抓住主要方面。哈弗大学历史学家刚写了一本书，文明：西方和其他文明，从历史学背景来看：“在500年中，西方发明了六项致命武器使它们脱颖而出。首先模仿的是日本。在过去的一个世纪里，一个接一个的亚洲国家开始复制这些致命武器——竞争、现代科学‘法律体系、和私有财产权、现代医疗、消费者社会和工作道德标准。”这六种东西是西方文明的秘密资源。
To this historical challenge from nations that have figured out how the West won, add a technological revolution. It is now possible to produce more goods and services with fewer and fewer people, to shift work almost anywhere in the world and to do all this at warp speed. That is the world the U.S. now faces. Yet the country seems unready for the kind of radical adaptation it needs. The changes we are currently debating amount to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
明白西方如何获胜的国家面临的历史挑战还要加上技术革命。现在可能用更少的人生产货物和服务，在世界上如何地方改变工作，最快速度做这些。这就是美国现在要面对的。然而这个国家好像还没有准备好适应它本需要的。现在我们的争论就像是重新安排泰坦尼克号上面的椅子一样是无用功。
Sure, the political system seems to be engaged in big debates about the budget, pensions and the nation's future. But this is mostly a sideshow. The battles in state capitals over public-employee pensions are real — the states are required to balance their budgets — but the larger discussion in Washington is about everything except what's important. The debate between Democrats and Republicans on the budget excludes the largest drivers of the long-term deficit — Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare — to say nothing of the biggest nonentitlement costs, like the tax break for interest on mortgages. Only four months ago, the Simpson-Bowles commission presented a series of highly intelligent solutions to our fiscal problems, proposing $4 trillion in savings, mostly through cuts in programs but also through some tax increases. They have been forgotten by both parties, in particular the Republicans, whose leading budgetary spokesman, Paul Ryan, praises the commission in the abstract even though he voted against its recommendations. Democrats, for their part, became apoplectic about a proposal to raise the retirement age for Social Security by one year — in 2050.
确实，政治系统好像在忙于预算、退休金和国家前途的争论。但是这最多像是一个杂耍。国会关于公职人员的争论是真的——要求国家平衡预算——但是华盛顿更多的讨论最多的都是除了最重要的以外的事情。民主党和共和党的争论排除了长期赤字的原因——社会安全、医疗补助和保健——并未涉及最大非受益权的开销如对按揭贷款利息减税。四个月前Simpson-Bowles 委员会就递交了关于我们财政问题的一系列非常好的解决办法。提出了一项节省4万亿的方案，该提议主要是通过削减计划也有少量的通过增加税收的办法来实现节约。但是他们都被两党遗忘了，特别是共和党人。他们的主要预算发言人Paul Ryan，虽然他对他们的建议投了反对票，但还是在摘要中赞扬了该委员会。民主党对于由于社保的问题而在2050年提高退休年龄一年的建议很愤怒。
Instead, Washington is likely to make across-the-board cuts in discretionary spending, where there is much less money and considerably less waste. President Obama's efforts to preserve and even increase resources for core programs appear to be failing in a Congress determined to demonstrate its clout. But reducing funds for things like education, scientific research, air-traffic control, NASA, infrastructure and alternative energy will not produce much in savings, and it will hurt the economy's long-term growth. It would happen at the very moment that countries from Germany to South Korea to China are making large investments in education, science, technology and infrastructure. We are cutting investments and subsidizing consumption — exactly the opposite of what are the main drivers of economic growth.
相反，华盛顿准备在可自由支配开支方面进行全面削减，但是在这方面的钱很少，也很少浪费。奥巴马总统想保留和增加核心计划的努力在国会演示时失败了。但是在教育、科学研究、航空控制、NASA、基础设施和可替代能源上面的削减不会带来节约，它会对经济的持续增长带来伤害。尤其是在这个关键时候更容易发生，而此时从德国到南非再到中国都对教育、科学、技术和基础设施大规模投资。我们削减投资和消费补贴——这恰好是经济增长的主要驱动。
So why are we tackling our economic problems in a manner that is shortsighted and wrong-footed? Because it is politically easy. The key to understanding the moves by both parties is that, for the most part, they are targeting programs that have neither a wide base of support nor influential interest groups behind them. (And that's precisely why they're not where the money is. The American political system is actually quite efficient. It distributes the big bucks to popular programs and powerful special interests.) And neither side will even talk about tax increases, though it is impossible to achieve long-term fiscal stability without them. Certain taxes — such as ones on carbon or gas — would have huge benefits beyond revenue, like energy efficiency.
因此，为什么我们处理经济问题的方式如此目光短浅和开始就出错呢？因为它政治上很容易。理解两党的关键在大多数情况下，他们实施这个计划，既没有获得广泛的支持也没有影响到他们身后感兴趣的人群。（这也恰好说明他们为什么不在钱多的地方。美国的政治系统非常有效率。它把大量的资金分配给受大众欢迎的计划和特殊利益群体。）尽管离开税收增加不可能取得长期的财政稳定，但是两派都没有谈及增加税收。某些税——如关于碳和天然气的——像提高能源效率一样除了税收外还能带来巨大的效益。
It's not that our democracy doesn't work; it's that it works only too well. American politics is now hyperresponsive to constituents' interests. And all those interests are dedicated to preserving the past rather than investing for the future. There are no lobbying groups for the next generation of industries, only for those companies that are here now with cash to spend. There are no special-interest groups for our children's economic well-being, only for people who get government benefits right now. The whole system is geared to preserve current subsidies, tax breaks and loopholes. That is why the federal government spends $4 on elderly people for every $1 it spends on those under 18. And when the time comes to make cuts, guess whose programs are first on the chopping board. That is a terrible sign of a society's priorities and outlook.
这不是因为我们的民主没有发挥作用，而是它工作的太好了。美国现在的政治对于选民的兴趣反应过度。所有这些兴趣都是为了保持过去而不是投资未来。对下一代工业没有游说群体，而仅有现在消费现金的公司。没有为我们孩子将来健康的经济着想的特说群体，只有现在从政府处受益的群体。整个系统就是为了保住现在的补贴、削减税收和漏洞。这也是为什么联邦政府在年长的人上每花费4美元而在不到18岁的人身上只花费1美元。当开始实施削减的时候，猜一下谁的计划将首先将被放到砧板上。这是一个社会优先考虑的事情和前景的非常可怕的信号。
The Perils of Success
成功的危险
Why have our priorities become so mangled? Several decades ago, economist Mancur Olson wrote a book called The Rise and Decline of Nations. He was prompted by what he thought was a strange paradox after World War II. Britain, having won the war, slipped into deep stagnation, while Germany, the loser, grew powerfully year after year. Britain's fall was even more perplexing considering that it was the creator of the Industrial Revolution and was the world's original economic superpower.
为什么优先权变的如此混乱？几十年前，经济学家Mancur Olson写过一本叫《国家的前进和倒退的书，在二战后，他收到他认为是奇怪之谜的启发。英国，赢得了战争，但是深陷于不景气之中，而德国，战败国，年复一年的强有力地增长。考虑到英国是工业革命发源地，也是世界上首个超级经济大国，那么英国的衰落让人十分费解。
Olson concluded that, paradoxically, it was success that hurt Britain, while failure helped Germany. British society grew comfortable, complacent and rigid, and its economic and political arrangements became ever more elaborate and costly, focused on distribution rather than growth. Labor unions, the welfare state, protectionist policies and massive borrowing all shielded Britain from the new international competition. The system became sclerotic, and over time, the economic engine of the world turned creaky and sluggish.
相反，Olson指出，是成功害了英国，失败帮助了德国。英国社会过的很舒服，自鸣得意，很死板，它的经济和政治配置变得越来越复杂和高成本，它把重心放到了分配上而不是增长上。工会、福利、保护性政策和巨大的债务都在新的国际竞争中阻碍了英国。整个系统变得僵硬和过时，曾经世界经济的引擎变得破旧和毫无活力。
Germany, by contrast, was almost entirely destroyed by World War II. That gave it a chance not just to rebuild its physical infrastructure but also to revise its antiquated arrangements and institutions — the political system, the guilds, the economy — with a more modern frame of mind. Defeat made it possible to question everything and rebuild from scratch.
德国，相反被二战彻底破坏。这给了它机会，不只是重建它的基础设施还有就是它可以修改它那过时的配置和制度——政治系统，协会。经济——以一种现代框架的思想。战败使它可以质疑任何问题，从头再建。
America's success has made it sclerotic. We have sat on top of the world for almost a century, and our repeated economic, political and military victories have made us quite sure that we are destined to be No. 1 forever. We have some advantages. Size matters: when crises come, they do not overwhelm a country as big as the U.S. When the financial crisis hit nations such as Greece and Ireland, it dwarfed them. In the U.S., the problems occurred within the context of a $15 trillion economy and in a country that still has the trust of the world. Over the past three years, in the wake of the financial crisis, U.S. borrowing costs have gone down, not up.
美国的成功使它变得僵化。我们已经站在世界第一的位置上将今一个世纪，我们反复的经济、政治的胜利使我们确信我们命中注定永远是第一。我们有一些优势。大小问题：在危险来临时，他们不能毁灭像美国这么大的国家。当金融危机袭击像希腊和冰岛这样的国家时，危机使他们变成了小矮人。在美国，问题出现在15万亿经济的背景下，而这个国家仍然获得世界的信任。在过去3年里，从金融危机中苏醒过来后美国借债成本下降而不是上升。
This is a powerful affirmation of America's strengths, but the problem is that they ensure that the U.S. will not really face up to its challenges. We adjust to the crisis of the moment and move on, but the underlying cancer continues to grow, eating away at the system.
这是对美国强大的证明，但是问题是他们使美国不能真正面对挑战。我们适应了此时的危机，然后我们继续前行，但是隐藏的癌症继续发展，在系统上继续侵蚀着。
A crucial aspect of beginning to turn things around would be for the U.S. to make an honest accounting of where it stands and what it can learn from other countries. This kind of benchmarking is common among businesses but is sacrilege for the country as a whole. Any politician who dares suggest that the U.S. can learn from — let alone copy — other countries is likely to be denounced instantly. If someone points out that Europe gets better health care at half the cost, that's dangerously socialist thinking. If a business leader notes that tax rates in much of the industrialized world are lower and that there are far fewer loopholes than in the U.S., he is brushed aside as trying to impoverish American workers. If a commentator says — correctly — that social mobility from one generation to the next is greater in many European nations than in the U.S., he is laughed at. Yet several studies, the most recent from the OECD last year, have found that the average American has a much lower chance of moving out of his parents' income bracket than do people in places like Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Canada.
对于美国来说，开始扭转局面的关键在于真诚地认识到自己现在在什么地方，从其它国家能学到什么标杆瞄准在商业上很平常，但是对于整个国家就有点冒犯了，任何一个胆敢建议让从其它国家学习——更别提复制——的政治家很有可能受到公开指责。如果有人指出欧洲只用了我们成本的一半就取得了较好的医疗卫生，那就是非常危险的社会主义者的想法。如果有商业领袖提出多数工业化国家的税率都比较低，并且比美国的漏洞少的多，那么他就是恶化美国工人，会被清扫出局。
And it's not just politicians and business leaders. It's all of us. Americans simply don't care much, know much or want to learn much about the outside world. We think of America as a globalized society because it has been at the center of the forces of globalization. But actually, the American economy is quite insular; exports account for only about 10% of it. Compare that with the many European countries where half the economy is trade-related, and you can understand why those societies seem more geared to international standards and competition. And that's the key to a competitive future for the U.S. If Olson is right in saying successful societies get sclerotic, the solution is to stay flexible. That means being able to start and shut down companies and hire and fire people. But it also means having a government that can help build out new technologies and infrastructure, that invests in the future and that can eliminate programs that stop working. When Franklin Roosevelt launched the New Deal, he spoke of the need for "bold, persistent experimentation," and he shut down programs when it was clear they didn't work. Today, every government program and subsidy seems eternal.
不只是政治家和商业领袖，还有所有的我们。美国人不会考虑所有的事情，了解不多，不会学习外面的世界。我们认为美国是一个全球化的社会因为它已经处在了全球化力量的中心。事实上，美国经济非常封闭，出口部分只占到了它经济的10%。这与许多欧洲国家相比，他们的经济的一半来与贸易有关。你能够理解为什么这些国家更容易赶上国际标准进行竞争。这才是美国具有竞争力未来的关键。如果Slosn说的成功社会使制度变得僵化是对的，那么解决的方法就是保持灵活。这就意味着开创、关闭公司，招聘和解雇人员。但是它也意味着要存在一个政府来帮助建立新科技和基础设施，能投资未来，能去除那些停止运转的计划。当富兰克林.罗斯福发布新政时，他提到了“勇敢的、持久的实验”的需要。他关停了一些很明显停止运转的项目。今天，许多政府计划和津贴好像永不熄火。
What the Founding Fathers Knew
创建父亲知道什么？
Is any of this possible in a rich, democratic country? In fact it is. The countries of Northern Europe — Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland — have created a fascinating and mixed model of political economy. Their economies are extremely open and market-based. Most of them score very high on the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. But they also have generous welfare states and make major investments for future growth. Over the past 20 years, these countries have grown nearly as fast as, or in some cases faster than, the U.S. Germany has managed to retain its position as the world's export engine despite high wages and generous benefits.
在任何一个富裕，民主国家这可能吗？事实上是可以的。北欧的国家——丹麦、瑞典、挪威、芬兰——创造了极有吸引力的政治经济混合模型。他们在经济自由的传统经济指标的得分非常高。他们的经济非常开放和市场化。他们在他们拥有良好的福利，主要投资于未来的增长。在过去的20年中，这些国家几乎同美国增长一样快，甚至在某些方面还快。尽管是高薪水和高福利，德国努力保持作为世界出口引擎的地位，
Now, America should not and cannot simply copy the Nordic model or any other. Americans would rebel at the high taxes that Northern Europeans pay — and those taxes are proving uncompetitive in a world where many other European countries have much lower rates and Singapore has a maximum personal rate of 20%. The American system is more dynamic, entrepreneurial and unequal than that of Europe and will remain so. But the example of Northern Europe shows that rich countries can stay competitive if they remain flexible, benchmark rigorously and embrace efficiency. (See "The World Economic Forum in Davos: A Changed Global Reality.")
现在，美国不应该也不能简单地复制北欧模型或者任何一个其他的模型。美国人应该反抗高税收，这在北欧国家是这么做的——这些税率在许多其他实施更低税率的欧洲国家被证明是没有竞争力的，新加坡拥有最高的个人税率——20%。美国的系统应该更有活力，创新精神和不同于欧洲，将来也要保持。但是北欧的例子说明发达国家如果保持灵活，设定严格标准和高效的话是可以具有竞争力的。
American companies are, of course, highly efficient, but American government is not. By this I don't mean to echo the usual complaints about waste, fraud and abuse. In fact, there is less of those things than Americans think, except in the Pentagon with its $700 billion budget. The problem with the U.S. government is that its allocation of resources is highly inefficient. We spend vast amounts of money on subsidies for housing, agriculture and health, many of which distort the economy and do little for long-term growth. We spend too little on science, technology, innovation and infrastructure, which will produce growth and jobs in the future. For the past few decades, we have been able to be wasteful and get by. But we will not be able to do it much longer. The money is running out, and we will have to marshal funds and target spending far more strategically. This is not a question of too much or too little government, too much or too little spending. We need more government and more spending in some places and less in others.
美国公司当然是高效的，但是美国政府不是。介于此，我不打算附和在浪费、欺诈、滥用权力方面的抱怨。实际上，美国人想的这些事情除了五角大楼的7,000亿预算外很少出现，美国政府的问题是资源分配的效率太低。我们在住房、农业、健康方面投入了巨大的补贴，它们中的许多扭曲了经济，对长期的增长毫无作用。我们在科学、技术、创新和基础设施方面投入的太少，这些能够刺激增长，在未来产生工作。在过去的几十年里，我们铺张浪费，得过且过。但是我们不能再这么干了。钱花光了，我们不得不安排资金，在策略上支出更多。这不是一个大和小的政府的问题，也不是支出多和少的问题。我们需要更高效的政府和在某些地方更大的开支，而在另一些方面则相反。
The tragedy is that Washington knows this. For all the partisan polarization there, most Republicans know that we have to invest in some key areas, and most Democrats know that we have to cut entitlement spending. But we have a political system that has become allergic to compromise and practical solutions. This may be our greatest blind spot. At the very moment that our political system has broken down, one hears only encomiums to it, the Constitution and the perfect Republic that it created. Now, as an immigrant, I love the special and, yes, exceptional nature of American democracy. I believe that the Constitution was one of the wonders of the world — in the 18th century. But today we face the reality of a system that has become creaky. We have an Electoral College that no one understands and a Senate that doesn't work, with rules and traditions that allow a single Senator to obstruct democracy without even explaining why. We have a crazy-quilt patchwork of towns, municipalities and states with overlapping authority, bureaucracies and resulting waste. We have a political system geared toward ceaseless fundraising and pandering to the interests of the present with no ability to plan, invest or build for the future. And if one mentions any of this, why, one is being unpatriotic, because we have the perfect system of government, handed down to us by demigods who walked the earth in the late 18th century and who serve as models for us today and forever.
悲剧的是华盛顿知道这些。对于所有的两党，大多数共和党人认为我们应该在一些主要领域投资，多数民主党人认为我们应该削减可自由支配的开支。但是我们拥有一个对折中和现实解决过敏的政治系统。这或许是我们最大的盲点。在我们的政治系统分裂的特殊时刻，一个人只能听进赞扬他的人——宪法和它创造的完美的共和党人。现在作为一名移民，我喜欢着他、独特的杰出的美国民主。我相信美国宪法是世界奇迹之一——在18世纪。但是今天我们年、面对的是已经破旧的系统这样一个现实。我们拥有一个没人明白的选举大学和一个不工作的议会。还有允许单个议员妨碍民主但是甚至不解释为什么的惯例和传统。我们有城镇、市政当局和州政府拼接的那些疯子。他们的权利、机构重叠，结果就是浪费。我们有一个不停募集知迎合现在而不计划、投资未来的政治系统，如果有人提起这些中的任何一点，那么他就是不爱国，为什么？因为我们拥有完美的管理系统，它通过18世纪走在末走在地球上的优秀分子传递给我们，这些人被今天以及永远看做我们的偶像。
America's founders would have been profoundly annoyed by this kind of unreflective ancestor worship. They were global, cosmopolitan figures who learned and copied a great deal from the past and from other countries and were constantly adapting their views. The first constitution, the Articles of Confederation, after all, was a massive failure, and the founders learned from that failure. The decision to have the Supreme Court sit in judgment over acts of the legislature was a later invention. America's founders were modern men who wanted a modern country that broke with its past to create a more perfect union.
美国的缔造者会被这些对先哲们的草率崇拜而深深的激怒。他们是全球的世界性的偶像，他们从过去和其他国家那里学习，经常修改它们的观点。第一部宪法，联邦法律还是一次巨大的失败，缔造者们从失败中学习。让高等法院坐在立法机关活动的裁判席上市后来的一个发明。美国的缔造者们是想要一个现代国家的现代人，他们打破过去创造一个更好的联盟。
And they thought a great deal about decline. Indeed, it was only a few years after the Revolution that the worrying began in earnest. The letters between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, as the two men watched America in the early 19th century, are filled with foreboding and gloom; you could almost say they began a great American tradition, that of contemplating decay. Americans have been concerned about the health of their country for much of its existence. In the 1950s and '60s, we worried about the Soviet Union and its march toward modernization. In the 1980s, we worried about Japan. This did us no harm; on the contrary, all these fears helped us make changes that allowed us to revive our strength and forge ahead. Dwight Eisenhower took advantage of the fears about the Soviet Union to build the interstate-highway system. John Kennedy used the Soviet challenge in space to set us on a path toward the goal of getting to the moon.
他们关于衰减也想了很多。确实，自从革命后这些担忧开始才没几年，托马斯.杰斐逊和琼.亚当斯之间的信件中充满了预感和忧郁，由于他们两人在19世纪早期观察美国。可以差不多说他们开始了美国的一个凝视颓败伟大传统。美国人远比担忧国家大存在更甚的是他们国家的健康。在20世纪50和60年代，我们担心的是苏联和它迈向现代化的步伐。在20世纪80年代，我们担心日本。这都对我们没有构成伤害；相反，所有的这些害怕帮助我们进行改革，这些改革让我们恢复我们的实力并稳步向前行进。艾森豪威尔利用害怕苏联来建造州际高速公路系统。肯尼迪利用苏联的太空挑战来使我们踏上了接近月亮的路上。
What is really depressing is the tone of our debate. In place of the thoughtful concern of Jefferson and Adams, we have its opposite in tone and temperament — the shallow triumphalism purveyed by politicians now. The founders loved America, but they also understood that it was a work in progress, an unfinished enterprise that would constantly be in need of change, adjustment and repair. For most of our history, we have become rich while remaining restless. Rather than resting on our laurels, we have feared getting fat and lazy. And that has been our greatest strength. In the past, worrying about decline has helped us avert that very condition. Let's hope it does so today.
真正令人不安的是我们争论的腔调。代替杰斐逊和亚当斯的思想上的担忧的是我们在语气和气质上站到了对立面，但是他们也明白在议会这是一项工作，一项未完成的伟大事业，它需要改革、调整和修理。对于我们历史的多数情况，当我们保持担忧时我们变得富裕。而不是在我们的荣誉上休息，我们害怕变得肥胖和懒惰。那是我们最强的实力。在过去，担心衰弱帮助我们改变我们的条件。让我期待今天也能同样起效。