西工大 航空学院:How it Works: White Paper on Mark I Containme...

How it Works: White Paper on Mark I Containment

A new report has just been developed on the Mark I containment design that is in use at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. It also explores U.S. and regulatory actions that made the design safer over the past several decades, noting “the Mark I pressure suppression containment is a proven technology that has been enhanced with confirmatory testing, enhanced knowledge and advanced analysis over time.”

In addition to explaining the boiling water reactor (BWR) design, the report, which can be downloaded from the Nuclear Energy Institute website, also makes initial observations about the performance of the containment system at Fukushima.

• “Coincident long-term loss of both on-site and off-site power for an extended period of time is a beyond-design-basis event for the primary containment on any operating nuclear power plant.”
  
  
• “The Mark I containment vessels appeared to have held pressure to well above the design pressure.”
  
  
• “The response of the reactor pressure vessel and reactor in general agree with severe accident management studies performed in the 1980s and early 1990s.”
  
  

Other topics in the report include: “Containment Operation During a Loss of Coolant Accident,” “Evolution of the Design,” and “Containment Operation During a Station Blackout.”

Regarding operation during a blackout, the report notes: “In the late 1980s and early 1990s, BWR operators made procedure changes and modifications to cope with events which involved the loss of the normal offsite power and normally available emergency diesel generators…. As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, additional actions and equipment were put in place at certain U.S. plants to allow water makeup to the reactor and the fuel pools should significant damage occur to the reactor buildings. These changes include pre-staged diesel-driven pumps, piping, and procedures that would support water makeup from various water supplies without the need for electrical power.”

* Download the full report from the NEI website.

Learn more in these GE Reports stories:
* Setting the Record Straight on Mark I Containment History
* Mark I Containment Facts and The New York Times
* The Mark I Containment System in BWR Reactors
* An Update on GE Disaster Relief Efforts in Japan
* Facts on the Nuclear Energy Situation in Japan (Update)

The NEI website is also providing updates on the situation in Japan.

Tagged as: Japan, Mark I, nuclear

4 Comments

1. design compliances and NY times says: March 20, 2011 at 2:16 pm

   Jeff/Keith/John and Sean …This is a great endeavor and effort by the GE team demonstration GE Way of compliance to the regulatory requirements…It would be nice if NY times could adopt this new data of the design compliance into their next print…otherwise, GE could put a commercial advertising pages on the FT, Japanese Economics news for broader knowledge’s …again, this is great and tremendous …

2. Dave Smith says: March 21, 2011 at 7:16 pm

   GE should have had a mobile generator helicoptered in on day 1.
   It has been 11 days. No one has ordered back up water pumps???
   GE + TEPCO = sHIP OF FOOLS!!!

3. J.D. Monty says: March 22, 2011 at 8:28 am

   This was very good information – especially the white paper. Those of us who have defended nuclear energy for years are encountering a lot of “I told you so’s” from people who we’ve argued this issue with in the past. This incident is a hard one to argue against, so good factual information is vital to us. When the communications take on the look of company propaganda it lets us down. We need something we can show to the skeptics that won’t have them laugh us out of the room. Some of the earlier communications fell in this category and were not helpful. This is a big improvement. A lot of us are engineers and our GE training has taught us to challenge and poke holes in any technical argument being made to us. This is no exception and you should expect us to do it here. GE needs to take the lead on getting credible factual information out to the public even if some of it may be embarassing. If we don’t get it out, the media will and it will look a lot less flattering. Better to err on the side of too much information. Nuclear is an important resource but we as a country will lose access to it if the industry doesn’t maintain its credibility with the public.

4. Donald Hudson says: March 22, 2011 at 5:17 pm

   J. D. Monty:

   Regarding, “This incident is a hard one to argue against, so good factual information is vital to us. When the communications take on the look of company propaganda it lets us down. We need something we can show to the skeptics that won’t have them laugh us out of the room. Some of the earlier communications fell in this category and were not helpful. This is a big improvement. A lot of us are engineers and our GE training has taught us to challenge and poke holes in any technical argument being made to us. This is no exception and you should expect us to do it here.”

   I am neutral on nuclear power – the argument will not be settled in a series of comments either here or in less hospitable sites but together they help inform readers who do seek alternate sources of information upon which to advance thinking on the technology.

   First, it must be acknowledged that an M8.9 earthquake and 18m tsunami is extraordinary in the experience of those countries living on the “Ring of Fire”. That said, as with aviation, nuclear technology is risk-intensive and design philosophies must accomodate extremely rare events. I can cite numerous examples in aviation which is my own specialty but organizational approaches to risk apply across many technologies. “Fail-stop” approaches to high risk technology extends across all disciplines and is not limited to aircraft structures or the industy itself.

   Given your comments above regarding poking holes in technical arguments, no exceptions, my question to you is about the diesel electrical generators and the almost-instant and complete failure of the first line of defense in maintaining core temperatures. Specifically, where, exactly, are the generators housed, how are they fueled and how is the entire installation protected? Was the Fukushima installation off-site, within the containment building itself or on-site but in a different housing structure? Were the diesel generators “in the basement” as so many have said or is this an incorrect assessment of the emergency generation installation?

   I would be grateful if you could clear up this one item as it is clearly material to understanding how, and why a first line of defence failed so rapidly and completely.

   Living on “the Ring of Fire”,

   Don Hudson
   Vancouver, BC