魁拔电子书下载:中国货币政策解读

2011年9月7日

Arthur R. Kroeber, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings-Tsinghua Center 

葛艺豪（Arthur R Kroeber），布鲁金斯研究所，布鲁金斯--清华公共政策研究中心非常驻研究员

The Brookings Institution

Arthur Kroeber expands upon a recent paper, answering questions about China's monetary policy on the valuation of the renminbi and the political issues this raises

葛艺豪在最近的一篇文章中，对中国人民币币值有关的中国货币政策和由此引起的政治问题作出解答。

1. The Chinese currency, or renminbi (RMB) has been a contentious issue for the past several years. What is the root of the conflict for the United States and other countries? 

1、过去几年，中国的货币，或者说人民币成为了有争议的问题，那么，美国和其他国家之间冲突的根源是什么？

The root of the conflict for the United States—and other countries—is complaints that China keeps the value of the RMB artificially low, boosting its exports and trade surplus at the expense of trading partners. Although the U.S. Treasury has repeatedly stopped short of labeling China a “currency manipulator” in its twice-yearly reports to Congress, it has consistently pressured China to allow the RMB to appreciate at a faster pace, and to let the currency fluctuate more freely in line with market forces. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and many economists have also argued for faster appreciation and a more flexible exchange rate policy. Partly in response to these pressures, but more because of domestic considerations, China has allowed the RMB to rise by about 25% against the U.S. dollar since mid-2005. Yet the pace of appreciation remains agonizingly slow for the U.S. and other countries in Europe and Latin America whose manufacturing sectors face increasing competition from low-priced Chinese goods. 

美国和其他国家冲突的根源，有人抱怨说，是由于中国人为地使人民币的币值被低估，以它的贸易伙伴的支出来提高其出口和贸易顺差。尽管美国财政部多次停止在两年一次向国会的报告中对中国贴上“货币操纵”的标签，但是它一直在对中国施加压力，令人民币更快升值，并且要求人民币更加自由地根据市场变化而波动。国际货币基金组织、世界银行和许多经济学家也都呼吁人民币更快升值和采用更加灵活的汇率政策。部分是为应对这些压力，但是更多地是出于国内因素的考虑，中国自2005年中以来，已经允许人民币对美元升值达到了大约25%。但是，对于美国、欧洲和拉丁美洲的许多国家来说，人民币升值的速度仍然是十分缓慢的，使他们国家的制造业面临来自低价格的中国商品日益强势的竞争。

2. What impact does exchange rate control have on the economy? 

2、外汇管制对经济的影响如何？

According to foreign observers, consistent intervention by China to keep its exchange rate substantially below the level the market would set is a price distortion that prevents international markets from functioning as well as they could. This price distortion also affects China’s own economy, by encouraging large-scale investment in export manufacturing, and discouraging investment in the domestic consumer market. Thus, it is in the interest both of China itself and the international economy as a whole for China to allow its exchange rate to rise more rapidly. However, Chinese policy makers do not agree with this view, and believe the managed exchange rate is broadly beneficial for economic development. 

根据外国观察员的观点，中国持续地干预汇率，使其汇率保持在大大低于市场汇率的水平是一种价格扭曲，阻止国际市场发挥市场可能发挥的作用。这种价格扭曲通过鼓励投资大量流向出口制造业，而阻碍向国内消费市场的投资，这同样会影响中国自己的经济。因此，为了中国自己和国际经济的利益，并且他们是作为一个整体，中国应该允许它的货币汇率更快地提高。但是，中国的政策制定者不认同这种观点，他们相信，有管制的汇率对经济发展有更大的好处。

3. What is the Chinese view of their policies toward exchange rate control? 

3、中国对其汇率管制政策是何看法？

Chinese officials see the exchange rate—and prices and market mechanisms in general—as tools in a broader development strategy. The goal of this development strategy is not to create a market economy but to make China a rich and powerful modern country. Market mechanisms are simply means, not ends in themselves. Chinese leaders observe that all countries that have raised themselves from poverty to wealth in the industrial era, without exception, have done so through export-led growth. Thus, they manage the exchange rate to broadly favor exports, just as they manage other markets and prices in the domestic economy in order to meet development objectives such as the creation of basic industries and infrastructure. 

中国的官员将汇率和价格以及市场机制一概看作是更广泛的发展战略中的一种工具。这个发展战略的目标不是建立一个市场经济，而是将中国建设成为一个富裕并强大的现代化国家。市场机制是只是手段，本身不是目的。中国的领导人认为，在工业化时代，所有从贫穷走向富裕的国家没有例外，都是靠出口拉动来做到的。因此，他们管理汇率大大促进了出口，就像他们在国内经济中管理其他市场和价格一样，是为了达到发展目标，例如建立基础工业和基础设施。

Since they perceive that an export-led strategy is the only proven route to rich-country status, they view with profound suspicion arguments that rapid currency appreciation and markedly slower export growth are “in China’s interest.” And because China is an independent geopolitical power, it is fully able to resist international pressure to change its exchange rate policy. 

既然他们认为出口拉动战略是被证明通向富裕国家的唯一道路，他们认为，对人民币快速升值和大幅放慢出口增长持不认同的态度是“对中国有利的”。并且，中国是一支独立的地缘政治力量，它完全有能力抵制国际上对它改变汇率政策的压力。

4. What are some misconceptions about China’s large-scale reserve holdings and investments in U.S. Treasury Bonds, specifically the idea that China is “America’s banker?” 

4、关于对中国持有大量外汇储备和投资美国国债，特别是关于中国是“美国的银行”观点的误解在哪里？

Because China’s central bank is the single biggest foreign holder of U.S. government debt, it is often said that China is “America’s banker,” and that, if it wanted to, it could undermine the U.S. economy by selling all of its dollar holdings, thereby causing a collapse of the U.S. dollar and perhaps the U.S. economy. These fears are misguided. China is not in any practical sense “America’s banker.” China holds just 8% of outstanding US Treasury debt; American individuals and institutions hold 69%. China holds just 1% of all US financial assets (including corporate bonds and equities); US investors hold 87%. Chinese commercial banks lend almost nothing to American firms and consumers – the large majority of that finance comes from American banks. America’s banker is America, not China. 

因为中国的中央银行是美国国债的最大单一外国持有者，人们常说成中国是“美国的银行”，并且如果中国想做，它是可以通过卖出其持有的全部美元，造成美元可能还有美国经济的崩溃，从而破坏美国经济。这种恐惧是误导。中国实际上根本谈不上是“美国的银行”。中国仅持有8%的未到期美国债券，而美国的个人持有69%。中国仅持有美国全部金融资产的1%（包括公司债和股权），而美国投资者持有87%。中国的商业银行几乎没有向美国公司和消费者贷款，这部分融资的绝大部分来自美国的银行。美国的银行是美国，而不是中国。

It is more apt to think of China as a depositor at the “Bank of the United States:” its treasury bond holdings are super-safe, liquid holdings that can be easily redeemed at short notice, just like bank deposits. Far from holding the United States hostage, China is a hostage of the United States, since it has little ability to move those deposits elsewhere (no other bank in the world is big enough). 

将中国看作是“美国银行”的存款人更为贴切：它持有的国债是超安全的，持有流动性资产可以非常容易地在短时间内给予通知即可取回，就像银行存款。非但不是将美国作为人质，中国倒是美国的人质，因为中国很难将这些存款转移到其他地方（世界上再也找不出像美国那么大的银行）。

5. What are the implications for U.S. policy and how should policymakers react? 

5、对美国政策有何影响，政策制定者应作何反应？

China’s exchange-rate policy is deeply linked to long-term development goals and there is very little that the United States, or any other outside actor, can do to influence this policy. Also, the same suspicion of market forces that leads Beijing to pursue an export-led growth policy generating large foreign reserve holdings also means that Beijing is unlikely to be willing to permit the financial market opening required to make the RMB a serious rival to the dollar as an international reserve currency. 

中国的汇率政策与其长期发展目标密切相关，美国或者任何其它外部力量都很难影响它的政策。并且同样，对市场力量的的怀疑，导致北京追求出口拉动增长的政策，产生大量的外汇储备，这也意味着北京不会愿意允许金融市场开放，使人民币成为与美元竞争的国际储备货币。

In substantive terms, there is little to be gained from high-profile pressure on China to accelerate the pace of RMB appreciation, since the United States possesses no leverage which can be plausibly brought to bear. U.S. policy should therefore de-emphasize the exchange rate, and instead focus on keeping the pressure on China to maintain and expand market access for American firms in the domestic Chinese market, which in principle is provided for under the terms of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.

实质上，对加快人民币升值的高调施压不会有多大效果，因为美国没有那么大的影响力。因此，美国的政策应该是，不要再强调汇率问题，而是应致力于对中国保持和扩大美国公司在中国国内市场的市场进入方面施加压力，这在原则上是中国加入世贸组织的条件所要求的。